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Abstract
Sick pay is a common provision in most labor contracts. This paper
employs an experimental gift-exchange environment to explore two re-
lated questions using both managers and undergraduates as subjects.
First, do workers reciprocate sick pay in the same way as they recip-
rocate wage payments? Second, do firms benefit from offering sick
pay? Firms may benefit in two different ways: directly, from workers
reciprocating higher sick pay with higher efforts; and indirectly, from
self-selection of reciprocal workers into contracts with higher sick pay.
Our main finding is that the direct effect is rather weak in terms of
effort and negative in terms of profits. However, when there is com-
petition among firms for workers, sick pay can become an important
advantage. Consequently, competition leads to a higher provision of
sick pay relative to a monopsonistic labor market.
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1 Introduction
Sick pay or sick leave provisions are standard in most labor contracts around
the world.1 Internationally, there is a large variety of different forms of sick
pay.2 Some of this variation is due to regulation. But in countries like the
US or the UK, where legal standards are minimal, variety is mainly due to
the choice of firms. This poses two interrelated questions. First, how do
workers react to different sick pay schemes? Second, will sick pay emerge
endogenously because it is profitable for firms to provide it?
By offering sick pay, the firm (partially) insures the worker against in-
come loss due to illness. Since this does not come without costs for the
firm, a rational firm either awaits a higher productivity from the worker or
some other part of the compensation package, e.g. the wage, needs to be
appropriately adjusted in order to maintain the same expected wage bill.
In this paper, we use a modified version of the standard gift—exchange
experiment in a labor market setting (see e.g. Fehr et al. 1993, 1997, 2007)
to explore these questions.3 Employers offer a wage scheme and workers
choose effort levels. Our first innovation is that workers can become “sick”,
i.e. they cannot show up for work even if they wanted to exert effort. The
second innovation is that firms can offer contracts with two components: a
wage if the worker shows up for work and sick pay if he does not, either
because he is sick or because he pretends to be (which the employer cannot
distinguish). The fact that labor contracts now involve lotteries make risk
preferences an important input and we elicit them through a Holt and Laury
(2002) questionnaire.
Finally, the third innovation of this paper is that we use both managers
and undergraduate students as subjects. It is often argued that undergradu-
ates are not representative of the population that is relevant for the questions
1Sick pay stipulates a replacement rate, that is, a percentage of the usual wage a worker
receives in case of sickness. Sick leave specifies a number of days per year that can be
missed without pay reductions. In the following we shall concentrate on sick pay although
much of the analysis also applies to sick leave as they are equivalent in a static framework.
2See e.g. Treble (2002) and Barmby et al. (2002) for partial surveys.
3See also Berg et al. (1995), Charness (2004), Hannan et al. (2002), and many others.
Falk (2007) finds support for gift-exchange in a field experiment.
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at hand such as, in our case, labor market relations. Undergraduates who
lack the experience of actual labor relationships may in fact behave system-
atically different from more experienced workers or managers. Furthermore,
in the context of sick pay, the question of whether one has the responsibility
for a family may become important. For these reasons, it is important to
start to expand the usual subject pool used by experimental economists to
include older and more experienced people.4
We first explore to what extent sick pay affects the firm’s profit directly
through enhanced effort from workers. We shall call this the direct effect.
The second, indirect effect may work through self—selection of workers.5 ,6
If it is the case that workers who value sick pay are also those that are
productive and provide higher effort, then firms may want to attract these
workers by offering contracts with sick pay provision.7 Our treatments are
designed to separate those two effects. In our (M)onospony treatment, each
worker is matched to just one employer. In this treatment, only the direct
effect can operate. In our (S)election treatment, there is competition among
employers for workers as workers are matched to the employers whose offered
contracts they prefer most.
Our main finding is that the direct effect is rather weak in terms of
efforts and actually negative in terms of profits. Although workers react to
higher sick pay with higher effort, this does not compensate for the higher
expected wage bill of firms. The results change completely when we allow for
competition among employers. In order to attract any workers, firms have
4Several studies have found significant treatment differences between the behavior of
managers and the typical subject population of undergraduate students. Managers are
found to be more prosocial in the gift-exchange game, Hannan et al. (2002); more trusting
in the trust game, Fehr and List (2004); and display higher level of strategic play in the
“ratchet effect” game, Cooper et al. (1999). Other studies found small and insignificant
differences, see e.g. Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider (2005).
5This important theme has recently been stressed in the empirical work on contracts
by Chiappori and Salaine (2003).
6 In the model of Coles and Treble (1993) sick leave occures in equilibrium due to the
self-selection of workers to appropriate contracts. What drives their results is private
information on both sides of the labor market.
7Surveys suggest that sick pay and health care are important determinants for the
attractiveness of employers to workers. See e.g. Fortune’s “100 Best Companies to Work
For” list (2008).
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to offer either generous sick pay or a very generous wage. The self—selection
of workers is such that offering sick pay becomes the more cost efficient way
for firms to induce the same effort level. As a result, profits are higher with
sick pay provision. This, in turn leads to a higher provision of sick pay when
firm compete for workers relative to a monopsonistic labor market.
Most of our qualitative results are the same for undergraduates and
managers. If anything, sickpay contracts are more profitable in the manager
treatment. The main reason for this is that our manager subjects have a
larger tendency to reciprocate generous contracts with higher effort.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section
we describe the experimental design and procedures. Results are analyzed
and discussed in Section 3. Finally, we close with a brief summary of our
findings.
2 Experimental design and procedures
In our experiment, we implement a modified gift—exchange game between
employers and workers. In all periods of the experiment, employers choose
a contract to offer to their employees and workers choose efforts given those
offered contracts. Workers can choose intended efforts, e˜, from the set
{0, 1, ..., 10}. An effort of 0 is interpreted as skipping work. After workers
choose their efforts, there is a random draw by the computer, independent
across periods and subjects, which with probability p = 1/3, sets the chosen
effort to 0. This random draw models the probability that workers become
sick and cannot appear at the workplace. Thus, with probability 2/3, real-
ized effort, e, equals intended effort, e˜; with probability 1/3, realized effort
is zero. Note that the employer cannot distinguish the cases when realized
effort is zero because the worker chose an intended effort of zero or because
the worker became sick. Effort costs for the workers are a function of realized
effort as shown in Table 1.8
Employers have to choose one contract from a menu of contracts. Each
contract is a pair (w, s) consisting of a wage, w, paid whenever the worker
8That is, when agents are sick, they have effort costs of 0.
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Table 1: The agent’s effort cost function
e 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
C(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 22
shows up for work (i.e. when e > 0), and sick pay, s, which is paid in case
the worker does not show up for work (i.e. when realized effort is zero). The
fact that wage payments can only be contingent on whether realized effort
is larger than zero or is based on the assumption that employer can only
verify whether workers shows up for work or not. As usual, different effort
levels e > 0 cannot be contracted upon e.g. because they cannot be verified
in court.9
The payoffs resulting from contract and effort choices are as follows.
Each unit of effort yields a gross profit of 20 to the employer. Deducting
wage payments we obtain
πE =
½
−s if e = 0
20e−w if e > 0 .
The worker’s payoff is given as
πW =
½
s if e = 0
w − c(e) if e > 0 .
The menu of contracts employers can choose from is shown in Table 2.10
Contracts (0,0), (50,0), and (75,0) provide no sick pay and mimic therefore
standard gift exchange contracts with varying levels of generosity. Con-
tracts (50,20) and (35,35) provide partial and complete replacement rates,
respectively.
A rational, self—interested worker who maximizes his expected payoff
would choose e = 0 for contracts (35,35) and (0,0) and e = 1 for all other
contracts. Given this, a self—interested employer would minimize his losses
9 If they were, there would be, of course, no interesting incentive problem.
10We restricted the number of contracts to 5 in order to obtain a sufficient number of
observations for each contract. Also, using the strategy method for effort choices would
have become impractical with more contracts.
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Table 2: The menu of five contracts
contract
(75,0) (50,20) (50,0) (35,35) (0,0)
wage when e > 0 75 50 50 35 0
wage when e = 0 0 20 0 35 0
Note: Realized effort e equals intended effort with probability 2/3 and 0 with probability
1/3.
by offering the (0,0) contract. Thus, obviously the (0,0) contract needs to
be included in the menu of contracts as a benchmark. The choice of the
other contracts in the menu was motivated by the informative comparisons
they allow. The (35,35) contract is a full insurance contract that dominates
(0,0) for all workers regardless of risk—aversion. The interesting question
is whether workers will reciprocate by providing sufficiently high effort to
make this contract profitable. The next comparison is between (35,35) and
(50,0). Note that the latter contract provides no insurance at all and pays
a lower expected wage.11 Thus, all workers should prefer contract (35,35).
Employers, however, should worry about moral hazard problems.
Comparing contract (50,20) to contract (50,0) allows to isolate the effect
of sick pay versus no sick pay for the same wage level. Again, the question
is whether workers will reciprocate the more generous sick pay with higher
effort levels. Finally, it should be interesting to compare contracts (50,20)
and (75,0) as the former should appeal to very risk averse workers while
the latter yields an higher expected wage. Depending on the preferences of
workers, either contracts could be seen as the best contract in the menu.
The experiment consists of four treatments (see Table 3 for details). In
treatment M (short for monopsony) we randomly and anonymously match
each worker with one employer. Simultaneously, the employer chooses a con-
tract, and the worker chooses intended efforts for each of the five contracts.
We use the strategy method since otherwise it would be difficult to collect
11 If workers exert individually rational efforts, they receive expected payments of
πW (50, 0) = 2/3 ∗ (50− 1) = 32.67 versus πW (35, 35) = 35.
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sufficient data on less attractive contracts.12 Then, the computer randomly
(with probability 1/3) decides whether the worker’s effort is set to zero. The
payoffs of the employer and the worker are determined based on the chosen
contract and the realized effort.
A variation of treatment M is treatment M-f (M-“framed”), which is ex-
actly the same as M with the exception that in the instructions the term “ill-
ness” or being “sick” is used instead of neutral language like “the computer
set efforts to zero.” We included this treatment to check whether actually
talking about sickness would trigger a different response from subjects.13
In treatment S (short for selection), there is competition among em-
ployers. Again, employers choose a contract, and workers choose intended
efforts for each of the five contracts. But now workers have to indicate a
preference ranking for the five contracts from the most preferred choice, 1,
down to the least preferred choice, 5. Then, we match workers and employ-
ers according to their preferences. Each worker is assigned to that employer
who had offered his most preferred contract. If the most preferred contract
is not available, then the worker is assigned to the employer offering the
next preferred contract and so on. In case there are several employers of-
fering the same contract, workers are distributed between them as equally
as possible. If an employer attracts no workers in a given period, his profit
is 0. This is an important consequence of self—selection and competition in
labor markets. If the offered contract is unappealing, then employers may
not find any interested workers. On the other hand, if an employer attracts
several workers, his total profit in this period is the sum of profits from all
his workers.14
Finally, the fourth treatment, treatment S-M (S-“managers”), is like
12To the extent that the use of the strategy method reduces the amount of reciprocal
behavior, our results will provide a lower bound for the effectiveness of gift—exchange
behavior.
13 In all treatments, we used an employer—worker frame since this seems to be the natural
setting. Note, however, that according to results by Fehr et al. (2007), the employer—
worker frame and a seller—buyer frame yield essentially identical results.
14Another option would have been to use the average profit generated by workers.
However, using total profits seemed more realistic to us for labor markets. Also, we
wanted to maximize competitive pressure among employers.
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treatment S, except that subjects in this treatment are managers instead of
undergraduate students.15 Subjects in this treatment are between 35 and
45 years old [check], most with at least 10 years of work experience. Most
subjects are already quite advanced in their career (vice president or similar)
and have leadership experience. Motivating their coworkers and hiring new
stuff are routine tasks in their work day.
Table 3: Treatments
treatment subject frame∗ competition number
name pool among employers of subjects
M undergrads neutral no 40
M-f undergrads sickness no 20
S undergrads neutral yes 60
S-M managers neutral yes 30
Note: ∗Thus refers to the explanation for the exogenous probability of 0 effort. In all
treatments a worker—employer frame is used.
The experiment is repeated for 10 rounds using a perfect stranger match-
ing (such that no employer is matched twice to the same worker) in treat-
ments M and M-f. In treatments S and S-M, stranger matching is not pos-
sible and we match subjects in fixed groups of 10 subjects, 5 workers and 5
employers. This choice was made with the intention of minimizing repeated
game effects and maximizing the competition among employers while still
producing a sufficient number of independent observations.
Subjects’ feedback at the end of each period is limited to results from
their own match to rule out reputation effects. Workers learn which wage
offer their employer made, whether the effort was set to 0 by the computer,
and their wage. Employers only learn their own payoff. Subjects cannot
observe their partner’s past behavior.
At the end of the gift—exchange experiment there is a questionnaire with
the following questions.
15For obvious reasons we did not have unlimited access to a subject pool with managers.
We therefore chose to let them play the selection treatment as we expected the most
interesting effects to occur in this treatment.
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1. Suppose you think of accepting a job in England. In England, options
with respect to sick pay vary from firm to firm.
(a) Firm A offers you a contract with a wage of 3000 Pound per
month. In case of illness, you receive the full wage.
(b) Firm B offers you a contract with a wage of 3450 Pound per
month. In case of illness, you receive 1500 Pound sick pay per
month.
(c) Firm C offers you a contract with a wage of 4400 Pound per
month. In case of illness, you receive nothing.
Which firms would you rank best and second best, respectively, when
the firms are the same in all other aspects?
2. What would you estimate, how many days in an average year with 220
working days would you miss due to illness?
3. Have you ever held a full—time job for more than a month?
4. With which statement would you agree more?
(a) The unemployed are primarily themselves responsible for their
situation.
(b) The unemployed most of the time had just bad luck.
5. I own savings sufficient to cover my living expenses for at least three
months. (yes, no)
Additionally, there are questions asking for gender, marital status, and
children.
Finally, a second questionnaire elicits risk preferences following the method
introduced by Holt and Laury (2002). This questionnaire is incentivized in
the usual way by randomly selecting one pair of lotteries by the throw of a
10—sided die. The chosen lottery is then resolved by throwing the die again.
In total, 150 subjects participated in our experiment. No subject par-
ticipated in more than one session. The experiments were conducted in the
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computer lab at the University of Mannheim. All undergraduate subjects
were recruited via the ORSEE online recruiting system (Greiner, 2004). The
managers were participants in an Executive MBA class. The experiment was
conducted during lunch break of the course and participation in the exper-
iment was voluntary. However, most participants chose to take part in the
experiment.
For the experiment, we used the z—tree software package provided by
Fischbacher (2007). After reading the instructions (see Appendix), subjects
had to answer a series of detailed questions in order to make sure that
they understood the experimental setting and were able to do all necessary
calculations. Subjects who could not correctly answer the questions after
additional explanation were replaced before proceeding.
To avoid wealth effects, subjects were paid their earnings from one ran-
domly selected period from the gift—exchange experiment. Each subject
threw a die to determine which period’s payoff was being paid. Payoffs from
this round were paid out with an exchange rate of 10 points = 1 euro. Addi-
tionally, subjects received their outcome from the Holt—Laury questionnaire
plus a show—up fee of 7.50 euro. The average payoff was about 15.82 euro
(about US $25 at the time of the experiment).16 Experiments lasted about
90 minutes including instruction time.
3 Results
A preliminary analysis revealed that there are no significant differences be-
tween sessions conducted with a “sickness frame” in treatment M and those
without. Neither the contract offers by employers nor the effort choices by
workers differ significantly between treatment M-f and treatment M, accord-
ing to MWU—tests. Thus, from now on, we pool the data from these two
treatments.
16Undergraduate subjects and managers were paid according to the same rules to pre-
serve comparability. Note however, that we did not have to compensate the managers
for their (considerably higher) opportunity cost of time since the experiment took place
during an all-day Executive MBA session.
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3.1 Effort choices and profits
Table 4 summarizes the effort choices of workers. Note that given the em-
ployed strategy method each worker chose efforts for each possible contract
in each period.
Table 4: Mean intended effort choices of workers
contract offered
(75,0) (50,20) (50,0) (35,35) (0,0)
treatment M, all workers 3.89 2.65 2.41 1.76 0.22
treatment S, all workers 3.18 2.87 2.56 2.28 0.17
if (75,0) ranked 1st 3.21 2.83 2.61 2.23 0.11
if (50,20) ranked 1st 3.05 3.17 2.70 2.77 0.40
treatment S-M, all workers 4.40 3.86 3.53 3.22 0.46
if (75,0) ranked 1st 4.46 3.54 3.57 2.60 0.83
if (50,20) ranked 1st 5.26 5.29 3.97 4.40 0.00
Note: Mean intended effort is averaged over all workers and periods.
In all treatments, effort choices are ordered in the following way,
e(75, 0) >
(p<0.001)
e(50, 20) >
(p=0.006)
e(50, 0) >
(p=0.002)
e(35, 35) >
(p<0.001)
e(0, 0).
For statistical tests we ran OLS regressions on the entire data set with effort
as dependent variable. Explanatory variables were dummies for the contract
offered by employers, treatment dummies, a period variable, and variables
encoding all questions from the questionnaire (see above). In order to ac-
count for repeat observations of the same subjects, we adjusted standard
errors through clustering by subjects. The only variables that significantly
influenced effort choice were the contract dummies. The above p—values
were obtained by rotating the omitted contract dummy and show highly
significant differences.17
The usual gift—exchange argument also works in our experiment. Al-
though workers in treatment M are certain of never meeting again the
17For treatment M, where each worker counts as an independent observation, we also
ran Wilcoxon—tests for related samples taking each worker’s average effort over all rounds
as one observation. The obtained p-values are qualitatively the same.
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same employer, they reciprocate higher wage offers with higher effort as
e(75, 0) > e(50, 0) > e(0, 0). Furthermore, sick pay also helps to increase
effort, as e(50, 20) > e(50, 0). However, a sick pay contract with 100% re-
placement rate seems to be inefficient for the employer. Although contract
(50,0) yields a lower expected wage than contract (35,35), and therefore
comes at lower cost for the employer, the effort choices for the former are
significantly higher than those for the latter.
One interesting observation is that effort choices of managers in treat-
ment S-M are substantially higher than effort choices of undergraduates in
treatment S. This holds for all offered contracts although the ranking of
effort choices is exactly the same as those of undergraduates. More proso-
cial behavior in the gift-exchange environment similar to ours has already
been observed by Hannan et al. (2002). American MBA students offer on
average about 20% higher wages in the role of an employer and provide any-
where between 10 - 50% higher efforts in the role of the employee than their
undergraduate counterparts. Thus, MBAs were able to realize about 40%
higher earnings than undergraduates. Fehr and List (2004) compared the
behavior of Costa Rican CEOs and undergraduates in the trust game. They
found similar treatment effect where both the amounts sent and returned
were about 30% higher for the CEOs. Our results are consistent with this
literature. The behavior of the managers could be attributed to their richer
experience with how powerful signs of trust and reciprocity can be in the
workplace. For us it is important that apart for more generous behavior of
the managers we do not find another qualitative differences in their choices
that are related to sick pay. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, the
choices of managers and undergraduates are mutually consistent.
We can summarize this in
Result 1 (Effort choices)
1. The usual gift exchange argument is replicated in our experiment:
higher wage offers significantly increase effort choices of workers.
2. Offering sick pay also significantly increases efforts of workers.
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3. However, offering sick pay with 100% replacement rate is domi-
nated by a contract that offers no sick pay but a pays higher wage
and costs employers less.
4. Managers exert substantially higher efforts than undergraduate
students.
Offering sick pay without medical examination invites an obvious moral
hazard problem. Rational, self—interested workers would “skip work“ (i.e.
choose zero intended effort) when offered contracts (35,35) and (0,0). Fur-
thermore, even workers who are guilt averse (i.e. workers who experience a
utility loss if they believe they let the employer down),18 may feel that they
can hide behind the probability of being sick. For guilt averse workers, the
trade—off between expected payoff and guilt becomes more favorable towards
skipping work when the replacement rate is higher. Table 5 shows the per-
centage of periods in which a worker intended to skip work (e˜ = 0) for the
different offered contracts. As expected, skipping work becomes more fre-
quent as the replacement ratio increases.19 For contracts (75,0) and (50,0),
which offer no sick pay, absence rates are very low. They are slightly higher
for contract (50,20), which offers partial replacement. With 100% replace-
ment ratios, absence rates are about 30% for undergraduates, which is high
but not as high as one would expect when workers were rational and self—
interested. Managers have an even lower frequency of skipping work of only
8.7%. Finally, about 90% of all workers skip work when the employer offers
no compensation at all.
In order to decide whether sick pay with partial replacement is of ad-
vantage to the employer, we have to look at profits generated from offering
contract (50,20) versus those generated from offering no sick pay as in con-
tracts (75,0) or (50,0).
Expected profit of employer j when offering contract (w, s) is calculated
18See e.g. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006).
19This confirms empirical studies on the moral hazard problem of sick pay, see e.g.
Henrekson and Persson (2004) and the literature cited there.
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Table 5: Frequency of skipping work
contract offered
(75,0) (50,20) (50,0) (35,35) (0,0)
treatment M 0.7% 7.0% 5.0% 36.3% 92.7%
treatment S 2.3% 4.0% 2.3% 26.7% 90.3%
treatment S-M 1.3% 0.0% 1.3% 8.7% 86.7%
Note: The frequency of skipping work is measured as the average frequency of
periods in which workers chose an intended effort of zero (i.e. not counting cases
of illness).
as
Eπj(w, s) =
2
3
⎛
⎝20
X
i∈Wj
e˜i −
X
i∈Wj :e˜i>0
w −
X
i∈Wj :e˜i=0
s
⎞
⎠− 1
3
X
i∈Wj
s, (1)
that is, given the intended efforts e˜i of employer j’s workers i ∈Wj . By us-
ing intended efforts rather than realized efforts, which can be set to zero by
illness, we eliminate the noise due to the random incidences of illness. Figure
1 shows the mean number of workers an employer attracted and the mean
expected profits of employers depending on the contract offered to work-
ers. The left panel of Figure 1 refers to treatment M. Given the one-to-one
matching structure in M, obviously each employer had one worker. With re-
spect to expected profits, we observe that the best contract is contract (75,0)
closely followed by (0,0). As seen in Table 4, contract (75,0) elicits the high-
est efforts from workers and in treatment M, this overcompensates for the
high wage payments. Somewhat surprisingly, a few workers exert effort even
when offered no wage at all, which causes positive profits for the (0,0) con-
tract. On the other hand, both contracts that offer sick pay produce losses
for employers on average. In order to assess significances, we again run OLS
regressions of expected profits on dummies for treatment/contract combi-
nations and the period variable, and rotate the omitted treatment/contract
dummy. Although we use a relatively conservative approach by clustering
for subjects, we find that in treatment M, profits with contract (75,0) and
with (0,0) are both significantly higher than those with (35,35) at the 5%
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Figure 1: Average number of workers per employer (bars, left scale) and
average total profit of employers form all workers (line, right scale) in treat-
ments M (left panel), S (center panel), and S-M (right panel).
level.20
The picture changes when we consider competition among employers as
in treatment S (see the center panel of Figure 1). Now the (75,0) contract,
which was best in M, is the worst contract (this treatment difference is signif-
icant at the 5% level, for both the OLS regression and MWU—tests).21 How-
ever, it attracts by far the most workers. Three contracts, namely (50,20),
(50,0) and (0,0) are about equally good for employers in terms of profits
20MWU—tests with data aggregated over periods show that profits with (75,0), (0,0),
and (50,0) are all significantly higher than those with (35,35) in treatment M.
21Due to the clustering of standard errors, profits in S for contract (75,0) turn out to
be only marginally lower than those for (50,0) and (0,0) at p < 0.06.
14
but only (50,20) manages to attract large number of workers. Not surpris-
ingly, employers who offered contract (0,0) failed to attract a single worker.
The full insurance contract (35,35) remains a loss maker for employers but
attracts its share of workers.22
The number of workers that each contract attracts is very similar in
treatment S-M with managers (see the right panel of Figure 1). However,
given that managers consistently exert higher efforts, all contracts that of-
fer a positive wage now become profitable for employers. But again, the
(50,20) contract, a contract that offers partial sick pay, seems to be the op-
timal contract for employers as it produces the highest profits and attracts
a substantial amount of workers.23 In contrast to treatment S, even the full
insurance contract (35,35) is now slightly profitable.
Why did contract (75,0) perform so badly in treatment S although it
still elicited the highest effort over all workers (see Table 4)? One reason
can be seen from Table 4, namely that the average efforts for contract (75,0)
were lower in S than in M such that efforts were not sufficient to compen-
sate for the high wage bill.24 Further aggravated were the losses by the
fact that each employer offering (75,0) attracted on average more than two
workers. In contrast, contract (50,20) elicited almost the same effort from
those workers who ranked this contract first (see the last two rows in Table
4). Since the total wage bill with contract (50,20) was lower than for (75,0),
profits were higher. In treatment S-M, contract (75,0) fared better because
managers exerted higher efforts. However, it is still dominated by contract
(50,20). Note in particular, that workers who ranked contract (50,20) first
in treatment S-M exerted an average effort of 5.29 versus 4.46 of those who
ranked (75,0) first (see Table 4).
Result 2 (Profits)
22Profits with (35,35) are significantly lower than those with (50,0) and (0,0) at the 1%
level according to the OLS regressions.
23Expected profits with contract (50,20) are significantly higher than those with (50,0)
and (0,0) at the 5% level. All other differences are not significant, at least when standard
errors are clustered.
24A possible explanation for this is that workers felt less responsible for reciprocating the
nice contract offer of the employer when they were not the only workers of this employer.
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1. Without competition among employers (treatment M), sick pay
is not a profitable contract option for employers. Both contracts
that offer sick pay are loss makers. The contract with the most
generous wage and no sick pay, contract (75,0) is the most prof-
itable.
2. With competition among employers (treatments S and S-M), the
(50,20) contract, a contract that offers partial sick pay, is the op-
timal contract for employers. In treatment S, it is the only con-
tract that roughly breaks even and attracts a substantial amount
of workers. In treatment S-M, it is the most profitable contract
and attracts a sufficient number of workers.
3.2 Contract offers
Figure 2 compares the contracts offered by employers in treatments M, S,
and S-M. While in treatment M contracts that offer low wages and no health
insurance dominate, in treatment S the (50,20) contract becomes the most
frequently offered contract, followed by the high wage contract (75,0). The
same two contracts are the two most frequently offered contracts in treat-
ment S-M. Thus, it seems that competition among employers yields more
provision of sick pay. Striking is in particular the difference in the frequency
of the (0,0) contract. Being the most frequent contract in treatment M, it
is rarely offered in treatment S because subjects immediately realized that
they could attract no workers with this contract.25 The full insurance con-
tract (35,35) is among the least popular contracts in both treatments. To
assess the significance of differences we ran probit regressions on the proba-
bility of choosing a particular contract as a function of a treatment dummy,
period, and all variables from the questionnaire, clustered by subject. Treat-
ment differences between S and M are significant at p < 0.05 for the (75,0)
and the (50,0) contract and at p < 0.001 for the (50,20) and the (0,0) con-
tracts. Regarding contract offers, managers show no significant difference
from undergraduates in the S treatment, except their lower usage of the
25There is no noticable time trend in the data on offered contracts.
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(0,0) contract at p < 0.05.
Result 3 (Contract offers)
1. Without competition among employers (treatment M), most em-
ployers offer the (50,0) contract or even the (0,0) contract. Sick
pay contracts are the very rarely offered.
2. With competition among employers, (treatments S and S-M), the
sick pay contract (50,20) and the contract with the most generous
wage (75,0) become the two most frequently offered contracts.
(0,0) is hardly ever offered.
The probit regressions further reveal that women are more likely than
men to choose contracts that include a sick pay component (p < 0.05 for
both (50,20) and (35,35)). Moreover, the generous contract (75,0) was more
often offered by employers who felt that unemployment is rather due to
bad luck than the worker’s own fault, p < 0.01. Subjects were less likely
to offer (50,0) when they had no savings sufficient for 3 months worth of
expenses, p < 0.05. Reversely, employers were more likely to offer the (0,0)
contract when they agreed with the statement that the unemployed are
mainly responsible for their own situation, p < 0.05.
3.3 Do you attract more reciprocal workers with sick pay?
When there is competition among employers, employers may try to attract
more productive workers through their contract offers. There is an indirect
story, which works if risk—averse workers are at the same time more recipro-
cal. Employers could then attract those more reciprocal workers by offering
generous sick pay, which would appeal to risk averse workers more. There
is also a more direct, behavioral story according to which workers may see
sick pay as a “nice contract”,26 and would reciprocate by exerting higher
effort than otherwise. In either case, we would expect to see that workers
who choose to work for an employer who offers a contract without sick pay
26See Fortune’s “100 Best Companies to Work For” list (2008).
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Figure 2: Distribution of contract offers by employers in treatments M (top),
S (center), and S-M (bottom).
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differ in a number of characteristics from workers who choose to work for an
employer who offers sick pay as part of the contract.
Table 6: Most preferred contracts by workers
contract
(75,0) (50,20) (50,0) (35,35) (0,0)
treatment S 69.3% 20.0% 3.3% 7.3% 0.0%
treatment S-M 55.3% 23.3% 4.0% 17.3% 0.0%
Note: Shown are the percentages of subject who ranked a particular contract first.
When workers ranked contracts differently in different periods, their ranking enter
weighted by the number of periods in which they ranked this contract first.
Table 6 shows the percentages of subjects who ranked a particular con-
tract as their first choice. The most popular contract is clearly the (75,0)
contract followed by the (50,20) contract. More than 70% of all subjects
rank those two contracts as their first two choices. The full insurance con-
tract (35,35) was rarely top—ranked by undergraduates but slightly more
frequently chosen by managers. The two other contracts are dominated and
hardly ever chosen. In the following, we therefore concentrate on the (75,0)
and (50,20) contracts.
Table 7 compares workers’ characteristics depending on whether they
ranked the (75,0) or the (50,20) contract first. Workers who prefer the con-
tract with sick pay are on average slightly more risk averse, more likely to
have had a full—time job, are more likely to agree with the statement that
unemployed mainly had bad luck, are more likely to be married, and are
more likely to have children. However, most differences are small. All re-
maining characteristics give conflicting evidence in treatments S and S-M.
To test for significant differences, we ran a regression (Probit, clustered by
subject) on the probability of preferring the (50,20) contract among those
who ranked (75,0) or (50,20) first with the explanatory variables being the
respective characteristics27 from Table 7 and period. The results (see Table
8) show that none of the characteristics are significant at the 5% level, al-
though the coefficients for risk aversion (the Holt/Laury risk cutoff) and “%
27We dropped ‘having children’, since this was strongly correlated with ‘married’.
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has worked full—time” are weakly significant at the 10% level and positive.
Thus, it seems that employers are not successful in attracting very different
types of workers when they offer sick pay.
Table 7: Sorting of workers in treatments S and S-M
S S-M
ranked 1st: ranked 1st:
Characteristics of workers (75,0) (50,20) (75,0) (50,20)
mean Holt/Laury risk cutoff 5.5 6.0 4.0 5.6
mean number of days ill 6.5 6.7 5.6 4.6
% male 57 48 88 100
% has worked full—time 70 95 100 100
% thinking unemployed had bad luck 24 38 45 49
% with savings for 3 months 73 62 89 100
% married — — 49 83
% having children — — 46 69
% preferring some sickpay
in UK labor contract
48 55 49 31
profit created by avg. worker
given preferred contract
−6.9 2.2 10.6 30.4
Note: Data from treatments S and S-M. When workers ranked contracts differently
in different periods, their characteristics enter weighted by the number of periods
in which they ranked this contract first.
Nevertheless, employers who offer sick pay get more ‘bang for the
buck.’ As Table 4 shows, average effort of workers is almost identical re-
gardless which of the two contracts they rank first (3.21 when (75,0) was
ranked first, 3.17 when (50,20) was ranked first). This is important because
the expected total wage payment with the (75,0) contract is 50.0 versus 40.0
for the (50,20) contract.28 Consequently, the last row of Table 7 shows that
profits created by the average worker who preferred the respective contract
differ substantially. Thus, although we cannot detect a systematic difference
among the workers attracted by the two contracts, employers are better off
under competition when they offer sick pay.
28Assuming that workers exert an effort of at least 1.
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Table 8: Probit analysis: probability of a ranking contract (50,20) first
Number of obs = 384
Log pseudolikelihood = −186.41
Pseudo R2 = 0.132
Coef. Std. Err. z P > z
period −.0320 .0260 −1.23 0.219
Treatment S-M −.3347 .5416 −0.62 0.537
Holt/Laury risk cutoff .1832∗ .1070 1.71 0.087
number of days ill .0119 .0301 0.40 0.692
male .0506 .5249 0.10 0.923
has worked full—time 1.153∗ .6777 1.70 0.089
thinks unemployed had bad luck .3614 .4159 0.87 0.385
has savings for 3 months .0201 .4744 0.04 0.966
married .7864 .6802 1.16 0.248
prefers sickpay in UK contract .1849 .3751 0.49 0.622
constant −2.92∗∗∗ 1.133 −2.58 0.010
Note: Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered by subject;
data includes all subjects who ranked either contract (75,0) or (50,20) first.
∗∗∗ significant at 1%-level; ∗ significant at 10%-level;
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution functions of risk cutoffs of workers in
Holt/Laury questionnaire grouped by their first—ranked contract
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Finally, we take a closer look at the question what explains workers’ pref-
erences for sick pay. Table 7 already shows that workers choosing the two
most popular contracts do not seem to differ much according to their mean
risk cutoff. This finding also holds when we look at the entire distribution of
risk cutoffs (see Figure 3). Although the distribution of risk cutoffs of work-
ers who choose (75,0) is unambiguously to the left (that is, less risk averse)
compared to workers who choose (50,20), there is only a small difference,
which is not significant according to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.29
Using the data from the Holt and Laury questionnaire and assuming a
constant relative risk aversion utility function U(x) = x1−r/(1− r), we can
also compute for each period the utility subjects would gain from choosing
each of the five contracts, given their actually chosen efforts for these con-
tracts. That way we achieve a ranking of contracts which we can compare
to the ranking that subjects announced.30 If subjects’ rankings were only
influenced by risk aversion, the two rankings should coincide. In fact, the
risk aversion ranking matches the real ranking only for 29.8% of cases. Even
when predicting just the contract which subjects ranked best, instead of the
full ranking, risk aversion alone manages to explain only 60.2% of all cases
(which is only moderately better than random choice given that more than
85% of workers chose one of the two contracts (75,0) and (50,20)).31
Result 4 (Self-selection of workers) We find no evidence that employ-
ers can attract better workers by offering sick pay. The observable
characteristics of workers vary only weakly with their preferred con-
tracts.
29When subjects ranked different contracts first in different periods, we used the one
ranking from the last period.
30Since the Holt and Laury procedure only pins down the parameter of relative risk
aversion to an interval, we occasionally get two different rankings for the upper and lower
boundary. In those cases, we use the ranking which is closer to the real ranking. Using
an exact value for relative risk aversion would lead to even lower explanatory power.
31Pooled data from treatments S and S-M. Manager’s choices are slightly better ex-
plained by risk preferences than undergraduate’s.
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4 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to better understand the reasons why firms
offer sick pay. Sick pay provision is an important part of most labor con-
tracts. It partially insures the workers against sudden loss of income form
unexpected absences. Therefore, some level of sick pay may be socially de-
sirable. Indeed, many countries already mandate relatively high levels of
sick pay. More importantly, however, even in countries with minimal regu-
lation (e.g. the US), sick pay or sick leave is commonly offered. This poses a
puzzle that we address in this paper: if firms are willing to raise their wage
bills by offering sick pay, what is it that they get in return? It could be that
workers simply reciprocate higher wages with even higher efforts; or it could
be that competition for workers allows productive workers to self-select to
contracts with sick pay.
The first conjecture is readily rejected by the data. It is certainly not
true that workers provide sufficiently high efforts to justify the usage of sick
pay. This can be nicely seen in our monopoly treatment where each worker
is randomly assigned to a unique employer. Although the average effort is
higher for the contract with sick pay (50,20) than without (50,0), the cost
of increased wage bill is excessive and makes sick pay unprofitable.
The second way how employers can benefit from sick pay is by using
it to attract hopefully more productive workers. This argument is quite
intriguing but we cannot conclusively confirm it. Contracts with sick pay
are less risky and therefore selection of workers might depend on their risk
preferences. If safer contracts attract more risk averse workers who are in
addition also more productive, then employers would benefit from offering
sick pay. However, this is not borne out by the data. There is no significant
difference in risk measures between those workers who have ranked sick pay
contract (50, 20) as their first choice and those who have ranked (75,0) as
their first choice. This leaves us with an interesting puzzle. Although we
do not find direct evidence of selection (e.g. through risk aversion), we do
observe that the average effort is the same (and even higher in treatment
S-M) for those who chose (50,20) and (75,0) even though the wage bill for
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(50,20) is much lower. This makes the contract with sick pay more attractive.
Why it is that workers work equally hard when offered (50,20) and (75,0)
we leave as an interesting question for future work. It may be that workers
do indeed self-select and work harder when offered sick pay but we cannot
trace this behavior to any of our observables.
Even apart form the preceding puzzle, our experiments clearly demon-
strate that if there is any value to sick pay then it is driven by the competi-
tion in the labor market. In our selection treatment, where employers com-
pete for workers, only two contracts are able to attract meaningful number
of workers: the best contract without sick pay (75,0) and the best contract
with sick pay (50, 20). It would be futile to offer other contracts because the
firm would not be able to find employees. In the competitive labor market
the firm must be concerned not only with the effort of workers but also with
the kind of workers that find the contract appealing. In our selection treat-
ment, contract (75,0) attracts twice as many workers as (50,20) but due to
the high variance of effort it ends up making losses. Thus the contract with
sick pay comes out on top. Employers clearly seem to realize this because
they offer (50,20) with the highest frequency in the selection treatment while
it is almost never chosen in the monopoly treatment.
Our results unequivocally support the market driven justification for
sick pay. The competition for workers seems to be crucial in sorting the
workers into appropriate contracts and making sick pay profitable. Most
importantly, our experiments show that competitive labor markets are able
to provide sick pay on their own without external intervention. This con-
tributes to the on-going debate on the necessity of regulation and mandatory
sick pay provision.
It would be premature, however, to conclude that sick pay provision can
be entirely left to the market. Recall that all workers in our experiment
had equal characteristics and productivities. An interesting extension for
future experiment could consider different types of workers to account for
a possible adverse selection problem on top of the considered moral hazard
problem. The fact that employers do condition the provision of sick pay on
characteristics of workers is shown by data from the US. There is a much
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higher frequency of sick pay provision for more attractive, higher—paying jobs
than for low paying jobs (see Economic Policy Institute, 2007). For example,
the chances of having access to sick pay are five—times lower for the workers
in the low wage category (earning less than $7.38 per hour) than for the
workers in the high wage category (earning more than 29.47 per hour). The
question thus is, does sick pay provision attract better workers or do more
productive workers have better bargaining power and therefore obtain sick
pay. Our results seem to suggest that the first explanation is less likely to
be relevant but future work needs to corroborate this.
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Appendix
A Instructions
A.1 Instructions, Treatments M and M-f
Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully. From
now on, do not talk to your neighbors. Please turn off your mobile phone and
keep it turned off till the end of the experiment. If you have any questions,
raise your hand. We will then come to you.
In the experiment, there will be “employers” (E) and “workers” (W).
Your role will be assigned by the computer at the start of the experiment.
You will be in the same role during the entire experiment.
The experiment will have 10 periods. In each period, each worker will
be matched with a new employer. That means it will never happen that an
worker and an employer will be matched with each other more than once.
No employer learns which worker is matched with him/her in any given
period. Neither do the workers learn about the identity of their matched
employers.
In each period the employer will make a wage offer to the worker. Doing
so, he/she can choose between five different wage offers. The worker chooses
an effort level for each contract. Since at this time the worker does not yet
know the wage offer of the employer, he/she has to provide an effort level
for all five possible wage offers. However, only the wage offer actually made
by the employer determines the payment.
The effort can be any integer between 0 and 10. Effort is associated
with costs for the worker, as given in the table below. All workers have the
same cost table. The revenue of the employer is twenty times the effort, but
one has to subtract the wage payment from this.
Effort 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cost for W 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 22
Revenue for E 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
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With probability 1/3, the worker falls ill and the realized effort,
which determines the payoff to employer and worker, is 0. [In Treatment M
this sentence is “With probability 1/3, the effort chosen by the worker will
be set to 0 by the computer.”] This happens for reasons that neither worker
nor employer can influence. The probability of this happening in any period
is independent of all previous periods and independent of the effort chosen
by the worker.
The five possible wage offers, which the employer can make, are:
1. A wage of 75, if the effort of the worker is at least 1, and a wage of 0,
if the effort is 0. (abbreviated as: {75,0})
2. A wage of 50, if the effort of the worker is at least 1, and a wage of
20, if the effort is 0. (abbreviated as: {50,20})
3. A wage of 50, if the effort of the worker is at least 1, and a wage of 0,
if the effort is 0. (abbreviated as: {50,0})
4. A wage of 35, if the effort of the worker is at least 1, and a wage of
35, if the effort is 0. (abbreviated as: {35,35})
5. A wage of 0, if the effort of the worker is at least 1, and a wage of 0,
if the effort is 0. (abbreviated as: {0,0})
Note that the payoff always depends on the realized effort (which may
have been set to 0 because of illness). [In Treatment M this sentence is “Note
that the payoff always depends on the realized effort (which may have been
set to 0 by the computer).”]
Payoff in one period
At the end of each period, workers learn which wage offer their employer
made, whether they were sick [In Treatment M: “whether the effort was set
to 0 by the computer”] and their wage. Employers only learn their payoff.
Payoff employer: 20 × effort − wage
Payoff worker: wage − cost of effort,
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where everything is based on the realized effort.
After this, a new period starts. After 10 periods, there will be a ques-
tionnaire. At the end of the experiment, we will call you out for payment.
A 10—sided die will be used to determine a random period. You will be paid
the payoff from this period with an exchange rate of 10 points=1 euro in
cash.
Additionally, you will get 7.50 euro for your participation.
A.2 Instructions, Treatments S and S-M
Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully. From
now on, do not talk to your neighbors. Please turn off your mobile phone and
keep it turned off till the end of the experiment. If you have any questions,
raise your hand. We will then come to you.
In the experiment, there will be “employers” (E) and “workers” (W).
Your role will be assigned by the computer at the start of the experiment.
You will be in the same role during the entire experiment.
The experiment will have 10 periods. You are in a group of 5 workers
and 5 employers. In each period, the employers will make wage offers to the
workers. Doing so, they can choose between five different wage offers.
The worker chooses an effort level for each contract. Since at this time
the worker does not yet know the wage offer of the employer he/she will
be matched with, he/she has to provide an effort level for all five possible
wage offers. Furthermore, the worker provides a ranking of all possible
wage offers: The wage offer he/she likes best is assigned a 1, the second
best a 2 and so on . . . This ranking determines with which employer (and
which wage offer) an worker will be matched with. The workers will be split
among the employers in the following way. An employer can employ several
workers, but an worker can only work for one employer. Among all wage
offers made by the employers, the computer will always find that one which
is best according to the ranking of the particular worker. The worker will
then be matched with this employer. If several employers are offering the
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same contract, workers who prefer this contract will be split among those
employers randomly.
The payoff of an worker is determined by his/her effort and the wage
offer made by the employer he/she is matched with.
The payoff of an employer is determined by his/her wage offer and the
effort of the workers he/she is matched with. If an employer is not matched
with any worker (because all workers preferred the wage offers of other
employers), he/she does not get any payoff this period.
No employer learns which worker is matched with him/her in any given
period. Neither do the workers learn about the identity of their matched
employers.
The effort can be any integer between 0 and 10. The effort is associated
with costs for the worker, as given in the table below. All workers have the
same cost table. The revenue of the employer is twenty times the effort, but
one has to subtract the wage payment from this.
Effort 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cost for W 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 22
Revenue for E 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
With probability 1/3, the effort chosen by the worker will be set to 0
by the computer. In this case, the realized effort, which determines the
payoff to employer and worker, is 0. This happens for reasons that neither
worker nor employer can influence. The probability of this happening in any
period is independent of all previous periods and independent of the effort
chosen by the worker.
The five possible wage offers, which the employer can make, are:
1. A wage of 75, if the effort of the worker is at least 1, and a wage of 0,
if the effort is 0. (abbreviated as: {75,0})
2. A wage of 50, if the effort of the worker is at least 1, and a wage of
20, if the effort is 0. (abbreviated as: {50,20})
3. A wage of 50, if the effort of the worker is at least 1, and a wage of 0,
if the effort is 0. (abbreviated as: {50,0})
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4. A wage of 35, if the effort of the worker is at least 1, and a wage of
35, if the effort is 0. (abbreviated as: {35,35})
5. A wage of 0, if the effort of the worker is at least 1, and a wage of 0,
if the effort is 0. (abbreviated as: {0,0})
Note that the payoff always depends on the realized effort (which may
have been set to 0 by the computer).
Payoff in one period
At the end of each period, workers learn which wage offer their employer
made, whether the effort was set to 0 by the computer and their wage.
Employers only learn their payoff. The payoffs are calculated as following:
Payoff employer: 20 × effort − wage
Payoff worker: wage − cost of effort,
where everything is based on the realized effort.
After this, a new period starts. After 10 periods, there will be a ques-
tionnaire. At the end of the experiment, we will call you out for payment.
A 10—sided die will be used to determine a random period. You will be paid
the payoff from this period with an exchange rate of 10 points=1 euro in
cash.
Additionally, you will get 7.50 euro for your participation.
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